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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PUBLICATIONS RLATNG TO PENDING CASES AS CONTEMPT OF COURT
The opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Harry
Bridges v. California and The Times-Mirror Co. v. The Superior Court
for the County of Los Angeles' makes it clear that the guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press contained in the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States is extended through the Fourteenth
Amendment to prevent a state court from unduly invading those freedoms by summary punishment of an out-of-court publication. Thus the
policy of using the Fourteenth Amendment to guard freedom of discussion from state encroachment, apparently first enunciated from the
bench by Justice Brandeis, 2 now has brought freedom to comment on
court cases, while they are pending, within its scope. Justice Black,
speaking for the majority, said that such punishment must come within
the "clear and present danger" test of the Schenck case.8
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions of petitioners for contempt of court arising out of publications of newspaper editorials and a
telegram. Both in the Superior Court and the California Supreme Court
petitioners challenged the state's action as a violation of the constitutional
guarantee of free speech, but the California Supreme Court affirmed the4
Superior Court's denial of this contentiod and upheld the convictions.
The California Code of Civil Procedure (Sec. 1209) said that no publication should be treated as contempt unless made in the presence of the
court while in session, but the California Court reaffirmed its holding in
In re San Francisco Chronicle5 that that provision of the Code was unconstitutional since courts have an inherent power to punish for
contempts, direct or constructive, and the legislature cannot infringe on
it. The California court relied on Toledo Newspaper Company v. United
States6 and decisions in eighteen states following it,7 to justify its throwing off of the plain legislature-imposed restriction on the court's power
to punish contempts. For support of the doctrine of inherent power the
I U.S. Law Week, Dec. 9, 1941, p. 4064, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. (Adv.) 149.
Certiorari granted because of importance of constitutional question involved, 309
U.S. 649. 60 S.Ct. 723, 84 L.Ed. 100, 310 U.S. 623, 60 S.Ct. 1098, 84 L.Ed. 1395.
2 Dissenting in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 41 S.Ct. 125, 65 L.Ed. 287
(1920). Brandeis stated that freedom of discussion was one of the privileges and
immunities of a United States citizen guaranteed against state encroachment by
the Fourteenh Amendment and intimated that it was also one of the liberties of
which no person could be deprived without due process of law.
s Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919).
4 Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. (2d) 464, 94 P. (2d) 983 (1939); TimesMirror Co., v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. (2d) 99, 98 P. (2d) 1029 (1940).
5 1 Cal. (2d) 630, 36 P. (2d) 369 (1934).
6 247 U.S. 402, 38 S.Ct. 560, 62 L.Ed. 1186 (1918).
7 Ala., Ark., Ariz., Conn., Fla., Ga., Ida., Ind., Md., N.D., Okla., R.I., S.D.,
Tenn., Tex., Utah., Vt., and Va. Eight others have expressed views in harmony
with it-Iowa, Kan., Minn., Miss., Neb., Ore., Wis., Wyo.
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majority leaned heavily on the English practice and on some statements by Blackstone8 based on a statement by Judge Wilmot in an opinion prepared for a case which was never decided. 9 The majority held that
the Bridges telegram "tended materially" and that the Times-Mirror
editorials "had a reasonable tendency" to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.
The telegram, for the subsequent publication of which in a Los Angeles newspaper Bridges was convicted, was sent by him to the Secretary of Labor after an injunction had been granted and while a motion
for a new trial and to vacate judgment was pending. It stated that the
attempted enforcement of the decree would tie up the Port of Los Angeles and affect the entire west coast. The first of the editorials for the
publication of which the newspaper was punished was entitled "Sit-down
Strikers Convicted." It commented on the case a day after conviction and
before sentencing, with hearty approval. The second editorial was published after a verdict of guilty and before sentencing. It was entitled
"Fall of an Ex-Queen" and drew a moral of the "right will triumph in
the end" type from the miserable end of a one time political boss. "Probation For Gorillas?" was published after a verdict of guilty, but before
sentencing, and while an application for probation was pending. It ended
up by saying that the judge would make a bad mistake if he granted probation and admonished him to send the convicted men to "the jute mill."
Justice Edmonds of the California Court wrote a strong dissent
in each case in which he said that the inherent power doctrine is
based on a fiction and an incorrect statement by Blackstone and that
therefor the statute ought to be upheld. He thought that White's decision
in the Toledo Newspaper case based on the so-called right of self-preservation was palpably incorrect. In his dissenting opinion Justice Edmonds
said that the guarantees of free speech in the Federal and the California
Constitutions are binding upon the courts and that no claim of judicial
necessity ought to outweigh them.
In order to understand the implications of the United States Supreme
Court's decision it is necessary to know briefly the history of the summary power to punish contempt by publication in the United States. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered the federal courts to punish all contempts. Then in 1826 Judge Peck attached a man named Lawless for contempt for out-of-court publications. The fear of the power of the federal
courts and of its abuse led to such an outcry against Peck's "tyranny"
that he was tried for impeachment and acquitted by a narrow margin.
But public opinion was thoroughly aroused against the summary power
and resulted in the Act of 183110 which limited, and still limits, the power
of federal courts to punish summarily for contempt to offenses in court
"or so near thereto" as to obstruct justice. By 1860, twenty-three of
8 4 Comm. 284 et seq.
9 King v. Almon, Wilm. 243, 97 Eng. Rep. 94 (1765).
10 28 U.S.C.A. § 385, as amended in 1911.
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the then thirty-three states had adopted similar laws." Although the state
courts began avoiding the legislative limitations on their assumed powers as early as 185512 the federal courts respected the Act of 1831 and
construed it as a limitation on their powers until 1918 when Justice White
in the Toledo Newspaper case came to the startling conclusion that that
act imposed no limitation not already existing and by necessary implication sanctioned the right of summary punishment of constructive contempts. Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented from what they called
"an amazing historical solecism." This decision was followed in seven
federal cases' s but in Nye v. United States 4 the United States Supreme
Court overruled what Frankfurter called the complete subversion of Section 268,1 5 and restored to plain language its obvious meaning by holding
that "so near thereto" means geographical, physical presence.
In the light of this background of the history of the clash between
freedom of the press and the assumed interest in protecting the independence of the judiciary, the United States Supreme Court came to pass
on the validity of a state court decision which had, at least to some
people,' 6 disturbing implications in that under its rule there was no limit
to the court's power to punish summarily for constructive contempt, so
that even law reviews could be conceived as in danger of its exercise.
Justice Black, in the majority opinion, held that even if there had been
a long English custom of putting utterances commenting on the work of
17
courts in pending cases in a class by themselves, which was doubtful,
it was a mistake to suppose that we adopted it in our Constitution, and
that the criteria applicable under the Constitution to other types of utterances are applicable in contempt proceedings in state courts to punish
out-of-court publications pertaining to a pending case. Although recognizing that the clear and present danger test as enunciated by Justice
Holmes in the Schenck case does not comprehend the whole problem,
Justice Black said it was handy in solving concrete situations and was,
in effect, that the evil must be extremely serious and the degree of immi11 Dissenting opinion of Justice Edmonds in Bridges case, supra; Walter Nelles
and Carol Weiss King, "Contempt by Publication in the United States," 28 Col.
L. Rev. 525 (1928).
12 State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855).
Is U.S. v. Craig, 266 F. 230 (1920); Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 44 S.Ct. 103,
68 L.Ed. 293 (1923); In re Independent Publishing Co., 240 F. 849 (1917); U.S. v.
Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524 (1917); U.S. v. Markewich, 261 F. 537 (1919);
U.S. V. Sanders, 290 F. 428 (1923); Francis v. People of Virgin Islands, 11 F. (2d)
860 (1926); U.S. v. Sullens, 36 F. (2d) 230 (1939).
14 313 U.S. 33, 61 S.Ct. 810, 85 L.Ed. 1172 (1941).
15 Robert E. Herman, "Recent Limitations on Free Speech and Free Press,"
48 Yale L.J. 54 (1938).
16 Ibid.
17 See dissenting opinion of Edmonds in Bridges case, supra n. 4, and dissenting opinion of Gibson in Times-Mirror case, supra n. 4. See also articles cited
in notes 11 and 15 supra; Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, "Power of
Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal Courts-A
Study in Separation of Powers," 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010 (1924).
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nence extremely high before utterances can or ought to be punished. 8
He concluded that the utterances punished below did not even tend to
bring about the feared evil-unfair administration of justice. It should be
noted that the majority stated that they were not considering a statute
which showed that the legislature had appraised a particular kind of
situation and found a specific danger sufficiently imminent to justify a
restriction on a particular kind of utterance.' 9
The dissenting Justices, Frankfurter, who wrote the minority opinion,
Stone, Roberts, and Byrnes, thought that "reasonable tendency" and
"clear and present danger" were substantially the same tests, that the
right of free speech was not absolute and ought not to be allowed to
interfere with the impartial administration of justice, and that a state
which had adopted the English means of attaining impartial justice ought
not to be told that it is improper and denies due process. They concluded
that the first two of the editorials mentioned above were mere comment
so not objectionable, but that "Probation For Gorillas?" threatened the
judge with denunciation and was a real attempt to exert outside influence and so to hamper the impartial administration of justice and that
the Bridges telegram was a threat to call a strike and an attempt to
coerce the mind of the judge in arriving at his decision and so to obstruct
justice.
The most obvious result of the decision is that it extends to another
field of discussion the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus
carrying further the policy begun in Gitlow v. New York 2o and extending down through Cantwell v. Connecticut,2 1 Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization,22 Lovell v. City of Griffin," Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olson, 24 Thornhill v. Alabama25 and others. It seems highly desirable that the power of a state court should be subject to some limitations on behalf of the personal and social interests in free and open
discussion, because, as Lord Camden said, 26 "The discretion of a judge
is the law of tyrants, . . . it is every vice, folly, and passion, to which
human nature is liable." And that unlimited summary power is necessary to maintain the independence of courts and to preserve their existence has been amply exposed as a fallacy by the life and dignity of the
courts of New York and Pennsylvania which have gotten along without
it for one hundred and fifty years and by the experience of the. federal
18 On this point also see Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the U.S. (1941).
19 See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 589, 84 L.Ed. 1213
(1940).
20 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925).
21 Supra n. 19.
22 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939).
23 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938).
24 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931).
25 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940).
26 See Lord Campbell, Lives of the Lord Chancellors (2d ed.), I, 13, n. 1, cited,
28 Col. L. Rev. 403 (1938).
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courts which did not have the power for seventy-nine years and yet
maintained their independent existence.
The test laid down by the court by which the power of the state
courts is to be kept within the constitutional limitation is open to question
on the ground of its indefiniteness and lack of stability of meaning
through times of changing tempers. After all, as the minority opinion
points out, "clear and present danger" and "reasonable tendency" are
different only in degree. Neither one provides a guarantee that freedom
of discussion, so vital to a democracy, will be preserved, especially on
behalf of a publisher of an unpopular minority opinion. Neither one gives
a writer or speaker a clear standard by which to determine in advance
whether or not his proposed utterance will be punishable by summary
action on the part of a disgruntled judge. Zechariah Chafee, in his valuable book on free speech, 27 has pointed out the pitfalls in the reasonable
tendency test when applied to the field of opinions and utterances.
Thomas Jefferson, in the Preamble to the Virginia Toleration Act of
December 26, 1785,28 showed how ill-suited to American standards of free
expression is the evil tendency test in the following words, "To suffer
the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to
restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of
their ill-tendency is a dangerous fallacy . . . because he, being . . .
judge of that tendency will make his opinions the rule of judgment."
Rather than lay down such an uncertain standard, it would seem preferable to have denied to state courts entirely the power to punish sum29
marily out-of-court publications, at least in the absence of statute.
The majority opinion intimates that a carefully drawn statute
clearly pointing out particular kinds of utterances in definitely specified types of situations and subjecting them to limited and reasonable
punishment might be upheld as a necessary limitation of the right of
free speech. In the light of the history of what state courts have done to
previous legislative attempts to curb their summary power, it is at least
doubtful whether a state statute such as this would be upheld by the
state courts, but the result would seem to be desirable. The social interest in free and open discussion as a means of arriving at the truth
and in deciding on the wisdom of policies is fundamental to the success
of a democratic system but the interest in securing to men on trial for
their lives or liberty a trial free from too much outside influence is also
extremely important and ought to be safeguarded by reasonable means.
To that end, what has been called "Trial by Newspaper" ought to be
Op. cit., supra, n. 18.
12 Hening's Statutes, Va., Ch. 34, p. 84.
An interesting commentary on the minority opinion, which would leave the
state courts' summary power practically without limit is that it was written by
Justice Frankfurter, who with Landis, wrote an article (37 Harv. L.R. 1010)
which, though dealing with federal courts, condemned summary punishment for
indirect contempts and blamed its origin on the notorious Star Chamber. In
that article he approved trial by jury as a remedy, yet now he would let a
court punish without a jury.
27

28
29
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regulated by statute. Many writers have pointed out that the practice
30
becomes a considerable evil in certain kinds of capital cases. The deci3
sion in the Sacco-Vanzetti case ' was probably influenced by the flood
of newspaper stories and comments on the defendants and the acts involved.3 2 Many labor and liberal leaders and writers have doubted the
33
because of
accuracy of the results reached in the Mooney-Billings Case
34
Some of this
the influence of newspaper comments on the outcome.
doubt might be removed from future cases, similar in nature, by some
clear legislative grant of power to the courts to punish flagrant out-ofcourt comment on pending capital cases, especially where what is really
on trial is some unpopular political belief. However, the safeguard of
trial by jury, for what it is worth, ought to be provided. The statutes
ought clearly to remove from punishment entirely those utterances
which do not influence decision but only scandalize the court or offend
its dignity. English courts have long since given up punishing the latter
type of utterance, which ought to be let alone, as the dignity and respect for courts depends on something more basic than lack of adverse
G. AjDLER
criticism of their work.

CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
APPEAL AND ERROR-ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR-EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COM-

wrrH COURT RULLE.-In the case of Swain v. Hoberg,' the appellant
filed his brief which was correct in all details save that it did not contain
a "brief statement of the errors relied upon for reversal" as provided
by Supreme Court Rule 39.2 In lieu of this, the appellant had set out
each error relied upon by itself and then proceeded to present his argument thereon immediately following, before giving the next point of
error. The appellee failed to take exception to the defect until after the
case had been taken under advisement when his motion to dismiss the
appeal and the appellant's countermotion for leave to amend were held
to be too late. The court, however, Justice Dove filing a vigorous dissent,
proceeded to dismiss the appeal of its own motion for failure to comply
with such rule.
Prior to the Civil Practice Act it was required that assignments of
PLY

30 Sullivan, The Law of Trial by Newspaper (3rd ed., 1941), quoting Chief
Justice Taft on page 137; Henry W. Taft, Law Reform; Frankfurter, The Case
of Sacco and Vanzetti.
3.a Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 151 N.E. 839 (1926); 259 Mass. 128,
156 N.E. 57 (1927); 261 Mass. 12, 158 N.E. 167 (1927); 275 U.S. 574, 48 S.Ct. 17, 72
L.Ed. 434 (1927).
32 Sullivan, op. cit.
33 People v. Mooney, 175 Cal. 666, 166 P. 999 (1917); 176 Cal. 105, 167 P. 696
(1917); 177 Cal. 642, 171 P. 690 (1918); 178 Cal. 525, 174 P. 325 (1918); 248 U.S. 579,
39 S.Ct. 21, 63 L.Ed. 430 (1918).
34 Sullivan, op. cit.
1 312 Ill. App. 610, 38
2

N.E. (2d) 966 (1942).
"The concluding subdivision of the statement of the case shall be a brief

statement of the errors or cross errors relied upon for a reversal. . .

Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.39.

."
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error be attached to or written on the record and compliance therewith
was considered essential.3 By the new Rule 36 it was provided: "No assignment of errors or of cross errors shall be necessary except . . . as
required in Rule 39." Rule 39, as adopted in 1933, did not include the
provision under interpretation, but it was added as an amendment in
1935. 4 The problem is one of interpreting the language of the Supreme
Court, that is, of determining the court's intent in making this modification of the rule.
It has been stated, "If the issues of the case are adequately raised
and presented in the brief and argument, the place where they appear is
not jurisdictional." 5 This would appear to be in line both with Section 76
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 6 which provides that no step other than
the perfection of the appeal shall be deemed jurisdictional, and Rule 36
which purportedly does away with the necessity of assignments of error.
However, the view has prevailed, as exemplified by the case of Bender
v. Alton Railroad Company,7 where it was said, "There being no statement of errors . . . in the concluding subdivision of the statement of the
case in the brief of appellant, we are without authority to review the
case ... ."s A statement of errors is still of importance. Hence, a total
omission would warrant dismissing the appeal.
In the instant case the appellant did set out the errors relied upon but
3 An appeal is treated as a new suit in another court, rather than a continuation of the case in the lower court and the assignment of errors was required
as being in the same position as the complaint in the lower court. Claffy v.
Farrell, 196 Ill. App. 65 (1915); Brown v. Otrich, 119 Ill. App. 136 (1905).
4 As adopted in 1933 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 110, § 241) the rule contained
the words "The brief of the appellant shall contain a short and clear statement
of the case showing . . . fifth, the errors relied upon for reversal." In 1935, the
words "the errors relied upon for reversal" were removed and in their place
was inserted, "The concluding subdivision of the statement of the case shall be
a brief statement of the errors or cross errors relied upon for a reversal.
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, Ch. 110, § 259.39.)
5 Trust Co. of Chicago v. Iroquois Auto Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 285 Ill. App.
317, 330, 2 N.E. (2d) 338, 342 (1936). See also City of Chicago v. Peterson, 360
Ill. 177, 178, 195 N.E. 636 (1935), where it was stated: "While this statement of
errors relied on is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this court, as we shall
hereafter show, it nevertheless is an attempt to comply with rule 39 of this
court, and, as such, is sufficient to prevent a dismissal of the appeal." Stroops
v. Jones, 285 Ill. App. 602, 3 N.E. (2d) 158 (1936), where the court heard the
appeal notwithstanding the fact that the appellant had disregarded the rules in
the absence of a motion to strike; Ledbetter v. Evans, 290 Ill. App. 533, 8 N.E.
(2d) 970 (1937), same ruling as preceeding case; Gyure v. Sloan Valve Co., 367
111. 489, 11 N.E. (2d) 963 (1937), which was cited in both the opinion and dissent,
is distinguishable on the ground that there was no setting out of the errors
relied on.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 200(2), contains the words "...
no step other
than that by which the appeal is perfected shall be deemed jurisdictional."
7 284 Ill. App. 419, 1 N.E. (2d) 108 (1936).

8 284 Ill. App. at p. 422, 1 N.E. (2d) at p. 110. See also Farmers State Bank
v. Meyers, 282 Ill. App. 549 (1935); Weindorf v. Keck, 285 Ill. App. 600, 3 N.E.
(2d) 120 (1936), where the court held that it did not have authority to hear an
appeal without brief statement of errors; Keckich v. New England Mut. Life Ins.
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not in the place in which they are customarily located, to wit; "in the
concluding subdivision of the statement of the case." 9 There was then,
probably an attempt to comply with the rule, although it is admittedly
not a literal compliance therewith. The fact that the rule was amended
some two years after its original adoption to include this requirement
may well indicate that the Supreme Court felt that the rule was not complete in its original form without providing for a definite place in which
the errors relied upon were to be stated in the brief. Having now so indicated, doubtless from their experience that a concise summary facilitates the disposition of the court's business, it would seem no hardship
to require appellant to comply with such practice. It is undoubtedly within the power of the court to dismiss an appeal if it feels that there has
been no attempt to comply with its rules, 10 and although it might appear
that the decision in the instant case is quite strict, and to some extent
arbitrary, applying the rule as it now stands, the decision cannot be
J. SAFEBLADE
deemed incorrect.
Co., 285 Ill. App. 600, 3 N.E. (2d) 150 (1936); Lipovsek v. Supreme Lodge of
App. 656, 3 N.E. (2d) 158 (1936), where
Slovene National Benefit Society, 284 Ill.
it was decided that where the appellant's brief contained no statement of errors
relied on in the proper place the court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
9 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.39. See n.2, supra.
124 at p. 132, 22 N.E. (2d) 930 at p. 935
10 Taylor v. City of Berwyn, 372 Ill.
(1939), where the court said: "Since the statute ordains that no step other than
notice of appeal is jurisdictional the determination of whether the method of
stating and arguing the issues sufficiently presents them for decision rests in the
discretion of the reviewing court." See also Trust Co. of Chicago v. Iroquois
App. 317, 2 N.E. (2d) 338 (1936).
Auto Ins. Underwriters Inc., 285 Ill.

